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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
for succession tax purposes is constitutionally unobjectionable,
is a word to the contrary. Nevertheless, the following language
also contained in the opinion is rather convincing: ". .. cer-
tainly, existing conditions no less imperatively32 demand pro-
tection of choses in action against multiplied taxation whether
following misapplication of some legal fiction or conflicting the-
ories concerning the sovereign's right to exact contributions.
For many years the trend of decisions has been in that di-
rection."
In connection with the action of the court in overruling
Blackstone v. Miller it is noteworthy that the attitude of the
court as far as the taxation of debts or choses in action is con-
cerned denotes a return to the view of the earlier state decisions
which held that for the purpose of an inheritance tax a chose in
action is to be regarded as situated with the creditor, so that a
debt due from a resident debtor to a nonresident decedent is not
taxable.3 3 Likewise, a bank deposit has been held a mere debt
due from the bank to depositor; as a mere chose in action it is
without actual situs. It may be taxed at the depositor's domi-
cile, and the state where the bank is located has refused to tax
it2 4 Professor Beale in criticizing the Blackstone case several
years ago35 said: ". .. by the great weight of authority it is
agreed that a debt has no territorial situs and can be taxed only
as part of the personal tax of the creditor. A creditor may be
taxed in the state of his domicile on all debts and choses in action
due to him; but the state of the debtor cannot tax a debt due to
a nonresident creditor." 3
WALLACE V. WILSON, JR., '30.
COMPLAINANT'S MISCONDUCT AS A DEFENSE TO HIS
ACTION FOR DIVORCE
So long as Roman Catholicism was the state religion of Eng-
land, that is, up to the reign of Henry VIII, marriage was re-
' That is, than tangibles having an extra-state situs.
'Allen v. Philadelphia Say. Fund Society (1879) 1 Fed. Cas. 234; Kint-
zing v. Hutchinson (1877) Fed. Cas. No. 7, 834; Gilbertson v. Oliver (1906)
129 Ia. 568, 105 N. W. 1002; Matter of Gordon (1906) 186 N. Y. 471, 79 N.
E. 722; Orcutt's Appeal (1881) 97 Pa. 179.
Pyle v. Brenneman (1903) 122 F. 787; State v. Clement Nat. Bank
(1911) 84 Vt. 167, 78 Atl. 944; Pendelton v. Com'th (1909) 110 Va. 229, 65
8. E. 536. The opposite view was taken in Matter of Houdayer (1896) 150
N. Y. 37, 44 N. E. 189, and again in Blackstone v. Miller (1903) 188 U. S.
189.
(1919) 32 HAuv. L. REV. 587 at 603.
Citing Jack v. Walker (1897) 79 1. 138; Collins v. Miller (1871) 43 Ga.
336; Foresman v. Byrns (1879) 68 Ind. 247; McCartney v. Gordon (1901)
127 Mich. 517, 86 N. W. 1042.
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garded by the church as indissoluble. This view of the canon law
was applied by the ecclesiastical courts in England, which had
jurisdiction over matrimonial causes. These courts went no fur-
ther in the direction of modern divorce than to grant a sort of
judicial separation known as divorce a mensa et thoro. But the
body of ecclesiastical law was not taken over as a part of the
common law by the courts in this country and as a result di-
vorce, as it is known in the United States, is almost entirely a
product of legislation., Hence it is inevitable that courts in the
various states of this country, lacking a common-law background
and substantial body of precedent, should differ widely in their
interpretation of problems arising in connection with divorce.
One such interesting problem is the question as to what mis-
conduct on the part of a spouse is sufficient to constitute a de-
fense to his own action for divorce, based on grounds in them-
selves sufficient, and it is with defenses of this nature that this
discussion is intended to deal.
In order properly to understand the extent and limit of such
defenses, and to get them located in their proper category, it is
first essential to understand the defenses of connivance and re-
crimination and to distinguish them from those subsequently
to be discussed.
Connivance is defined by Keezer as "the consent, express or
implied, of one spouse to the misconduct of the other.' 2 Some
cases say that a corrupt intent on the part of complainant that
the guilty party should commit the offense is an essential ele-
ment of connivance.3 On one point, at least, the courts are
agreed. If the misconduct does amount to connivance it is with-
out question a good defense to complainant's action.4 The ques-
tion as to what misconduct constitutes connivance is a much
more difficult one. According to Leavitt v. Leavitt" the right to
a divorce for adultery is barred by connivance, but knowledge
of the wife's adulterous disposition and failure to remonstrate
is not connivance. A New Jersey case, on the other hand, holds
that when a husband knows his wife is tempted and he does
not remove the temptation to adultery, though it is easily within
his power to do so, he is guilty of connivance and his suit on the
ground of his wife's adultery is barred.6 A Massachusetts case
sums up the matter in this way: "He may properly watch his
wife whom he suspects of adultery, in order to obtain proof of
See Keezer, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (2d ed. 1923) 167.
'Keezer, op. cit. 292.
'Herriford v. Herriford (1913) 169 Mo. A. 641, 155 S. W. 855.
19 C. J. p. 90, sec. 209.
(1918) 229 Mass. 196, 118 N. E. 262.
'Sargent v. Sargent (N. J. 1920) 114 AtI. 428.
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that fact. He may do it with the hope and purpose of getting a
divorce if he obtains sufficient evidence. He must not, however,
make opportunities for her, though he may leave her free to fol-
low opportunities which she has herself made. He is not obliged
to throw obstacles in her way, but he must not smooth her path
to the adulterous bed."17 It is apparent from the decisions that
no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what constitutes
connivance. It is for the court to decide on the circumstances of
each particular case.
Recrimination may'be defined as the commission by the com-
plainant of acts which afford sufficient grounds for divorce.8
While it is true that the offense set up in recrimination need not
be of the same nature as the one relied upon in the libel, yet it
must be such as to constitute, in law, a sufficient ground for
divorce. The theory is that divorce is a remedy for the innocent
against the guilty and, of course, if the parties are equally at
fault there can be no decree for either. But the typical suit
barred by recrimination is easily distinguished from a suit in
which defendant sets up complainant's misconduct in justifica-
tion of the offense upon which the suit is based. In the latter
the defendant is guilty of an offense constituting grounds for
divorce. The complainant is guilty of a lesser offense. But the
lesser contributes to and in some measure causes the greater, on
which the suit is based. In recrimination, on the contrary, the
offense of the one spouse need have no connection with that of
the other. Hence for the one to constitute a defense to the other
it must in itself be a ground for divorce.
As distinguished from the defenses of connivance and recrimi-
nation, the misconduct of complainant is often set up by defend-
ant in mitigation of the offense upon which the suit is predicated.
Typical examples arise in suits based upon adultery, cruelty and
desertion and in these connections the defense may well be
considered.
In the first situation we have conduct on the part of the hus-
band which is conducive to the adultery which his wife commits,
though in itself it is not sufficient ground for divorce. In Pike
v. Pike0 a young man married a chorus girl and model, but they
lived apart and kept the marriage secret. The husband fur-
nished his wife with living expenses but gave her none of the
other protection and care usually incidental to marriage, though
Noyes v. Noyes (1907) 194 Mass. 20, 79 N. E. 814.
8 Keezer, op. cit. 304.
9 Cushman v. Cushman (1907) 194 Mass. 38, 79 N. E. 809; Malone v.
Malone (1905) 76 Ark. 28, 88 S. W. 840; Appeltofft v. Appeltofft (1925)
147 Md. 603, 128 Atl. 273.
(1927) 100 N. J. Eq. 486, 136 Atl. 421.
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he was fully aware of her previous incontinence. The wife com-
mitted adultery. She brought an action for divorce on the
ground of desertion and the husband brought a cross-bill on the
ground of adultery. The husband had not in fact deserted.
Neither party was granted a divorce, the husband's cross-bill
being denied on the ground that his conduct, though it was not
such as to give the wife a cause for divorce, was conducive to
the commission of her offense and hence constituted a good
defense.
In suits based on the ground of cruelty we have very much
the same situation. Says Corpus Juris: "The general rule is
that a divorce will not be granted on the ground of cruelty when
the cruelty was provoked by the misconduct of the complain-
ant."" The difficult question is what amount of misconduct is
sufficient to provoke or justify defendant's cruelty. According
to Bohan v. Bohan12 the misconduct of a complainant, to defeat
the right to a divorce for cruelty, need not have been equal to
the defendant's, but must have been of the same general char-
acter and such as was reasonably calculated to provoke the de-
fendant's misconduct. It is also sometimes said that misconduct
of complainant constituting a defense on the ground of provoca-
tion, justification, or excuse, need not be such as in itself would
entitle defendant to a divorce.3 Here again it is almost impos-
sible to lay down a general rule as to what misconduct will con-
stitute justification. In Weirsmith v. Weirsmith- the friend-
ship of a wife, thirty-five years of age, with a Bible class leader,
seventy-four years old, where evidence showed that he had noth-
ing more than a fatherly interest in her welfare, was held no
justification for cruel treatment alleged by the wife as a- ground
for divorce. After all, each decision of a court in a divorce
action depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.
There seems to be no reason why the misconduct should be of
any particular degree so long as the court finds that it is such
as is reasonably calculated to provoke defendant's misconduct.
Now if the circumstances are such as to justify or excuse one
spouse in separating from the other, the latter cannot obtain a
divorce for desertion.'" This raises the question as to what mis-
conduct of a spouse will justify the other in leaving home. It is
often said that to justify desertion of one spouse the misconduct
of the other must be such as would in itself constitute a ground
" 19 C. J. p. 78, sec. 175. See also Smith v. Smith (Tex. 1918) 200 S. W.
1129; Hatchett v. Hatchett (1923) 89 Okla. 176, 214 Pac. 929; White v.
White (1921) 100 Ore. 387, 197 Pac. 1080.
"(Tex. 1900) 56 S. W. 959.
" 19 C. J. p. 77, sec. 171.
(Iowa 1917) 161 N. W. 439.
" 19 C. J. p. 79, sec. 177.
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for divorce.16 But some courts hold that conduct not in itself
constituting grounds for divorce may yet be sufficient to justify
desertion.17 In Campbell v. Campbell'8 a husband sued his wife
for divorce on the ground of desertion, the wife having left home.
In a previous suit by the husband on the ground of habitual in-
temperance the wife filed a cross-complaint on the ground of in-
tolerable cruelty. Both grounds were there held insufficient to
justify a divorce. In the later action it was held error for the
trial court to reject testimony of the wife as to the husband's
cruelty merely because it had been held to be insufficient as a
ground for divorce. A case in West Virginia, Hamilton v. Ham-
ilton,"'9 holds that misconduct insufficient even to justify deser-
tion, though it was conducive to it, may prevent a decree to the
deserted party.
A related question is raised in divorce suits based on con-
strubtive desertion. It is held by many" courts that the husband
is the deserter if, without just cause, he subjects his wife to such
treatment as compels her to leave him.20 Moreover, some courts
hold that to justify the innocent spouse in leaving home and to
constitute constructive desertion the treatment must be such
that an action for divorce could be predicated directly on that
conduct or treatment. 21  On the other hand some jurisdictions
hold that the misconduct which caused the innocent spouse to
leave need not be such as would be a ground for divorce.22 The
West Virginia court in Hall v. Hall23 held that though the acts of
the offending spouse were not sufficient to constitute grounds
for divorce yet the innocent spouse was justified in leaving
home. A court in the same state in Roberts v. Roberts2 4 held that
if the offended spouse was justified in leaving she could procure
a divorce on the ground of constructive desertion. But to adhere
"Arnaboldi v. Ariaboldi (N. J. 1929) 144 Atl. 917; Douglas v. Douglas
(1928) 156 Tenn. 655, 4 S. W. (2d) 358; Craig v. Craig (1909) 90 Ark. 40,
117 S. W. 765; Frank v. Frank (1913) 178 Ill. App. 557; Towson v. Tow-
son (1920) 126 Va. 640, 102 S. E. 48.
1 Lyster v. Lyster (1873) 111 Mass. 327; Hall v. Hall (1911) 69 W. Va.
175, 71 S. E. 103; Wulke v. Wulke (1921) 149 Minn. 289, 183 N. W. 349;
Hardin v. Hardin (1850) 17 Ala. 250; Watts v. Watts (1894) 160 Mass.
464, 36 N. E. 479.
'. (1929) 110 Conn. 277, 147 Atl. 800.
(1921) 87 W. Va. 534, 105 S. E. 771.
"Roberts v. Roberts (W. Va. 1929) 150 S. E. 231; Elder v. Elder (1924)
139 Va. 19, 123 S. E. 369; Pattison v. Pattison (1918) 132 Md. 362, 103
Atl. 977; Lundy v. Lundy (1922) 23 Ariz. 213, 202 Pac. 809; MacPherson
v. MacPherson (1926) 100 N. J. Eq. 91, 135 Atl. 91.
Pidge v. Pidge (Mass. 1841) 3 Met. 257; Dwyer v. Dwyer (1885) 16
Mo. A. 422; Padelford v. Padelford (1893) 159 Mass. 281, 34 N. E. 336;
Lynch v. Lynch (1870) 33 Md. 328; Barnett v. Barnett (1901) 27 Ind. App.
466, 61 N. E. 737.
1 Curlett v. Curlett (1903) 106 Ill. App. 81. See 9 R. C. L. p. 362, sec.
149.
' See note 17 above. 2 See note 22 above.
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to the holding of the latter case is in effect to say that any con-
duct on the part of a spouse which justifies the other in leaving
gives the latter a right to a divorce. But the problem as to what
misconduct will justify a spouse in leaving then becomes just as
difficult to determine as the amount which will justify a divorce,
and though the formalistic basis has been changed the actual
problem as to where to draw the line remains the same. Massa-
chusetts cannot be accused of this inconsistency for in that state
a divorce cannot be granted on the ground'of constructive deser-
tion unless the acts of the guilty party were such as to justify
the other in obtaining a divorce on those grounds alone. The
West Virginia court obviously is subject to criticism on this
point.
Now the divergent opinions of different courts and the incon-
sistent positions of the same court in different cases have been
briefly pointed out. The chief difficulty seems to arise from the
use of legal terminology, such as the use of the term connivance
in connection with defenses to suits based on adultery. Courts
disagree as to what constitutes connivance, some holding the
corrupt intent necessary and others going very far in implying
it. It is of little importance that courts uniformly hold con-
nivance a good defense so long as they differ widely as to what
constitutes it. They have a legal term which scarcely has a
meaning except as each court gives it one, and as a result it
serves to confuse more than to aid. Likewise in the cruelty cases
the courts refuse to grant the divorce where the defendant's
cruelty was "provoked" by misconduct of complainant. But
here again what constitutes sufficient provocation is a subject of
controversy. In the cases of desertion it is easy for the courts to
say that no divorce will be granted if the spouse leaving home
was "justified" in doing so, but when they start to determine
what is justification some say it must be such misconduct as
would constitute grounds for divorce and others say less mis-
conduct than this will be sufficient. The same difficulty arises in
cases of constructive desertion.
Divorce is a legal field in which there is much litigation at the
present time. It is a problem of public importance and one
which we cannot afford to treat lightly. Hence the treatment of
it by the courts should be anything but superficial. The general
principles of law with regard to divorce are fairly well defined
and uniformly recognized by the courts, but in the application of
these principles there are glaring inconsistencies. Many of these
arise from the courts' attempts to place the parties' misconduct
in certain legal categories and to determine from these what the
decision should be. But if the courts would look more to the sub-
stance and less to the form it is certain that their positions would
be much more consistent and the general handling of the problem
much more efficient.
BARTON L. WARREN, '31.
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